Tuesday, August 5, 2014

السيد وزير الكهرباء

السيد الوزير محمد ابراهيم وزير الداخلية
برجاء انك تميل على وزير الكهرباء وتقوله ، لا ينفع تصريحك بتاع ان مشكلة انقطاع الكهرباء امامها ٥ سنوات للحل ، لان ضعاف النفوس لن يعطوك فرصه فى هذا الظلام الدامس ، الا وارتكبوا المزيد من الجرائم، وسوف تظهر الداخليه مقصره ، المسئولية مشتركه كا وزاره ، جنب الله مصر الفتن والارهاب

Saturday, August 2, 2014

Hillary Rodham Clinton. Hard Choices.

الجزء الخاص بالربيع العربى الفصل ١٥ صفحة ٤٣٥ ، والجزء الخاص باحداث الثوره المصرية بدء من صفحة ٤٤٤ وينتهى فى اول صفحة ٤٦٠، الجدير بالذكر بان الفصل رقم ٢٠ يتناول غزه واشاره الى دور مرسي المخزى فى تلك القضية والتى نعانى منها الى الان

“On January 25, protests in Cairo against police brutality grew into massive demonstrations against the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak. Tens of thousands of Egyptians occupied Tahrir Square in the heart of the city and resisted efforts by the police to force them to disperse. Day after day the crowds in the square grew, and they became focused on a single goal: driving Mubarak from power.
I had known Mubarak and his wife, Suzanne, for nearly twenty years. He was a career Air Force officer who had risen through the ranks to become Vice President under Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian ruler who fought the Yom Kippur War with Israel in 1973 and later signed the Camp David Accords. Mubarak was injured in the extremist attack that assassinated Sadat in 1981, but he survived, became President, and cracked down hard on”

“on Islamists and other dissidents. He ruled Egypt like a pharaoh with nearly absolute power for the next three decades.
Over the years I spent time with Mubarak. I appreciated his consistent support for the Camp David Accords and a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians. He tried harder than any other Arab leader to convince Yasser Arafat to accept the peace agreement negotiated by my husband in 2000. But, despite his partnership with the United States on key strategic matters, it was disappointing that after so many years in power his regime still denied the Egyptian people many of their fundamental freedoms and human rights and was badly mismanaging the economy. Under Mubarak’s rule, a country known to historians as the “breadbasket of antiquity” struggled to feed its own people and became the world’s largest importer of wheat.
In May 2009, Mubarak’s twelve-year-old grandson died suddenly from an undisclosed health problem. The loss seemed to shatter the aging leader. When I called Suzanne Mubarak to offer my sympathy, she told me the boy had been “the President’s best friend.”

“For the Obama Administration, the protests in Egypt presented a delicate situation. Mubarak had been a key strategic ally for decades, yet America’s ideals were more naturally aligned with the young people calling for “bread, freedom, and dignity.” When asked by a journalist about the protests on that first day, I sought to offer a measured response that reflected our interests and values, as well as the uncertainty of the situation, and avoided throwing further fuel on the fire. “We support the fundamental right of expression and assembly for all people, and we urge that all parties exercise restraint and refrain from violence,” I said. “But our assessment is that the Egyptian Government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people.” It would turn out that the”

“regime was certainly not “stable,” but few observers could have predicted just how fragile it actually was.
On January 28, President Obama joined a meeting of the national security team in the White House Situation Room and asked us for recommendations about how to handle events in Egypt. The debate around the long table went back and forth. We delved once more into questions that had bedeviled U.S. policymakers for generations: How should we balance strategic interests against core values? Can we successfully influence the internal politics of other nations and nurture democracy where it has never flowered before, without incurring negative unintended consequences? What does it mean to be on the right side of history? These were debates we would have throughout the so-called Arab Spring.

“Like many other young people around the world, some of President Obama’s aides in the White House were swept up in the drama and idealism of the moment as they watched the pictures from Tahrir Square on television. They identified with the democratic yearnings and technological savvy of the young Egyptian protesters. Indeed Americans of all ages and political stripe were moved by the sight of people so long repressed finally demanding their universal human rights, and repulsed by the excessive force the authorities used in response. I shared that feeling. It was a thrilling moment. But along with Vice President Biden, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, I was concerned that we not be seen as pushing a longtime partner out the door, leaving Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the region to an uncertain, dangerous future.
The arguments for throwing America’s weight behind the protesters went beyond idealism. Championing democracy and human rights had been at the heart of our global leadership for more than half a century. Yes, we had from time to time compromised those values in the service of strategic and security inter”

“ests, including by supporting unsavory anti-Communist dictators during the Cold War, with mixed results. But such compromises were harder to sustain in the face of the Egyptian people demanding the very rights and opportunities we had always said they and all peoples deserved. While before it had been possible to focus on the Mubarak who supported peace and cooperation with Israel and hunted terrorists, now it was impossible to ignore the reality that he was also a heavy-handed autocrat who presided over a corrupt and calcified regime.
And yet many of the same national security interests that had led every previous administration to maintain close ties with Mubarak remained urgent priorities. Iran was still attempting to build a nuclear arsenal. Al Qaeda was still plotting new attacks. The Suez Canal remained a vital trade route. Israel’s security was as essential as ever. Mubarak had been a partner in all these areas, despite anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments among his own people. His Egypt served as a linchpin of peace in a volatile region. Were we really ready to walk away from that relationship after thirty years of cooperation?”

“Even if we did decide that was the right choice, it was far from clear how much influence we could actually have on events on the ground. Contrary to popular belief among many in the Middle East, the United States has never been an all-powerful puppet master able to achieve any outcome we desire. What if we called for Mubarak to step down, but then he refused and managed to stay in power? What if he did step down and was succeeded by a lengthy period of dangerous disorder or by a successor government no more democratic and actively opposed to our interests and security? Either way, our relationship would never be the same and our influence in the region would erode. Other partners would see how we treated Mubarak and lose trust and confidence in their relationships with us.
Historically, transitions from dictatorship to democracy are”

“fraught with challenges and can easily go terribly wrong. In Iran in 1979, for example, extremists hijacked the broad-based popular revolution against the Shah and established a brutal theocracy. If something similar happened in Egypt, it would be a catastrophe, for the people of Egypt as well as for Israeli and U.S. interests.
Despite the size of the protests in Tahrir Square, they were largely leaderless, driven by social media and word of mouth rather than a coherent opposition movement. After years of one-party rule, Egypt’s protesters were ill prepared to contest open elections or build credible democratic institutions. By contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood, an eighty-year-old Islamist organization, was well positioned to fill a vacuum if the regime fell. Mubarak had driven the Brotherhood underground, but it had followers all over the country and a tightly organized power structure. The group had renounced violence and made some efforts to appear more moderate. But it was impossible to know how it would behave and what would happen if it gained control.”

“These arguments gave me pause. Along with the Vice President, Gates, and Donilon, I counseled caution. If Mubarak falls, I told the President, “it all may work out fine in twenty-five years, but I think the period between now and then will be quite rocky for the Egyptian people, for the region, and for us.” But I knew the President wasn’t comfortable sitting by and doing nothing while peaceful protesters were beaten and killed in the streets. He needed a path forward that urged Egypt toward democracy but avoided the chaos of an abrupt regime collapse.
On Meet the Press on Sunday, January 30, I tried to set out a sustainable approach. “Long-term stability rests on responding to the legitimate needs of the Egyptian people, and that is what we want to see happen,” so I said that we hoped to see a “peaceful, orderly transition to a democratic regime.” My using the word”
“orderly rather than immediate was intentional, although unpopular in some quarters of the White House. Some on the President’s team wanted me to at least foreshadow Mubarak’s departure, if not call for it. I, however, thought it was crucial that the rhetoric from me and others in the administration help Egypt achieve the reforms most of the protesters sought with a soft landing rather than a hard thud.
When I spoke with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit that week, I urged the government to show restraint and demonstrate that it would be responsive to the demands of the people. “It’s going to be challenging for President Mubarak to make the case that he’s heard people after thirty years unless he holds free and fair elections and doesn’t try to engineer his successor,” I told Aboul Gheit. “That is not tomorrow’s business,” he responded. “Tomorrow’s business is to pacify the people and settle them down.” But he agreed to pass along my concerns.

“Mubarak, however, wasn’t listening. Even as unrest escalated and the regime’s control of the country appeared to be slipping, he delivered a defiant speech late on the evening of January 29 in which he fired many of his Cabinet Ministers but refused to resign or limit his own term in office.”

“I recommended to President Obama that he dispatch an envoy to talk with Mubarak in person and persuade him to announce a strong package of reforms, including an end to the country’s repressive emergency law that had been in effect since 1981, a pledge not to run in the elections already planned for September, and an agreement not to put forward his son Gamal as his successor. These steps might not satisfy everyone, but they would be significant concessions and give the protesters a chance to organize ahead of the elections.
For this delicate assignment, I suggested Frank Wisner, a retired senior diplomat who had served as Ambassador to Egypt from 1986 to 1991 and had developed a strong personal relation”

“ship with Mubarak. They had spent many hours together discussing the region and the world. Like his great friend Richard Holbrooke, Wisner cut his diplomatic teeth in Vietnam before representing our country in hotspots all over the world. In addition to Egypt, he served as Ambassador in Zambia, the Philippines, and India before retiring in 1997. I thought that if any American could get through to Mubarak, it would be Wisner. But some in the White House were skeptical of Wisner and his mission. They were ready to cut Mubarak loose. President Obama was losing patience, but he ultimately agreed with me to give diplomacy one more chance.”

“Wisner met with Mubarak on January 31 and delivered our message. Mubarak listened but didn’t give an inch. He was stressed, maybe even bewildered by what was happening around him, but he was in no way ready to give up his power. Like so many autocrats before him, he had come to view himself as inseparable from the state. Mubarak was enough of a realist to know he couldn’t sit in his palace and ignore the protests altogether. So he sent out his newly appointed Vice President, the longtime intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, to propose a national dialogue about possible reforms. Two days earlier Mubarak had selected Suleiman to fill the long-vacant Vice Presidency as a half-hearted attempt to calm the protests. Neither the promise of a national dialogue nor the appointment of a Vice President placated anyone.”

“That night the military also released a remarkable statement declaring that it would not use force against the Egyptian people and recognizing the legitimacy of the protesters’ rights and demands. This was an ominous sign for Mubarak. If the military abandoned him, there was no way he could remain in power.
The first day of February saw more huge protests. That afternoon in the White House Situation Room, the national security team once again debated what to do. Halfway through our discussion, 

we received news that Mubarak was going on television to address the nation. We turned to the large video screens and waited to see what the embattled leader would say. Mubarak looked old and tired but sounded defiant. He promised not to run in the September election, to seek reforms to the Constitution, and to ensure a “peaceful transfer of power” before the end of his term. But he did not lift the emergency law or say that his son would not run in his place, nor did he offer to begin handing over any of his absolute powers. Mubarak had actually come around to much of what Wisner had asked of him, but it was too little, too late—both for the crowds in the streets and the team in the Situation Room.”

“That’s not going to cut it,” President Obama said, visibly frustrated. Then he called Mubarak and said the same thing. We debated whether the President should make a public statement declaring that he was done waiting for Mubarak to do what was right. Once again senior Cabinet officials, including me, counseled caution. We warned that if the President appeared to be too heavy-handed, it might backfire. But other members of the team appealed once again to the President’s idealism and argued that events on the ground were moving too quickly for us to wait. He was swayed, and that evening he went before the cameras in the Grand Foyer of the White House. “It is not the role of any other country to determine Egypt’s leaders. Only the Egyptian people can do that,” President Obama said. “[But] what is clear—and what I indicated tonight to President Mubarak—is my belief that an orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.” When Press Secretary Robert Gibbs was asked at his briefing the next day to define “now,” his answer left little room for doubt. “Now means yesterday,” he said.”

“Things in Cairo got worse. Regime supporters came out in force and clashed violently with protesters. Men wielding clubs and other weapons swept through Tahrir Square on camels and”

“horses, cracking heads. I called Vice President Suleiman to make it clear that such violent repression was absolutely unacceptable. The Egyptian leadership did not repeat this tactic in the following days. On February 4, I spoke once again to Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit. In earlier conversations he had come across as confident and upbeat. Now he couldn’t hide his frustration, even desperation. He complained that the United States was unceremoniously shoving Mubarak out the door without considering the consequences. Listen to what the Iranians are saying, he warned. They are eager to take advantage of Egypt’s potential collapse. His fear of an Islamist takeover was visceral. “I have two granddaughters, one six and the other eight,” he told me. “I want them to grow up to be like their grandmother and like you. Not wearing a niqab like in Saudi Arabia. This is the fight of my life.”

“His words stayed with me as I flew to Germany to address the Munich Security Conference, a key gathering of leaders and thinkers from across the international community. For all our talk about supporting democracy, what did that really mean? Surely more than just one election, one time. If Egypt’s women saw their rights and opportunities rolled back under a newly elected government, was that democracy? What about if minorities like Egypt’s Coptic Christians were persecuted or marginalized? If Mubarak was going to leave the presidency and Egypt was going to begin a transition, then these questions about what would happen next would become relevant and pressing.”

“In Munich, as in Doha a month before, I made the case for political and economic reforms across the Middle East. “This is not simply a matter of idealism,” I said. “It is a strategic necessity. Without genuine progress toward open and accountable political systems, the gap between people and their governments will only grow, and instability will only deepen.” Of course, these transitions would look different and proceed at different speeds in”

“each country, depending on their unique circumstances. But no nation could ignore the aspirations of their people forever.

At the same time, I warned, we should be clear-eyed about the risks inherent in any transition. Free and fair elections would be necessary, but not sufficient. Functioning democracies require the rule of law, an independent judiciary, a free press and civil society, respect for human rights, minority rights, and accountable governance. In a country like Egypt, with a long history of authoritarian rule, it would take strong, inclusive leadership and sustained effort from across society, as well as international support, to put these building blocks of democracy in place. No one should expect them to appear overnight. My words that day may have sounded out of tune with the hope and optimism many felt watching the protests in Cairo, but they reflected the challenges I saw ahead.”

“At the same conference in Munich, Wisner, as a private citizen and no longer playing any role for the administration, appeared via satellite to offer his personal opinion on the situation. This distressed the White House, which thought it had his assurance that he would not discuss his mission publicly. Wisner made waves by saying Mubarak shouldn’t go immediately but should oversee a transition. His comments came across as contradicting the President, and the White House was annoyed that Wisner had overstepped his brief. The President called me to express his unhappiness about the “mixed messages” we were sending.”

“That’s a diplomatic way of saying he took me to the woodshed. The President knew events in Egypt were not in America’s control, but he wanted to do right by both our interests and our values. So did I. I knew Mubarak had stayed too long and done too little. But beyond getting rid of him, the people in Tahrir Square seemed to have no plan. Those of us who favored the stodgy-sounding “orderly transition” position were concerned that the”

“only organized forces after Mubarak were the Muslim Brotherhood and the military.
By February 10, hundreds had been killed in clashes with security forces. The violence fed the protesters’ rage and their demands that Mubarak resign. Rumors swirled that he would finally bow to the pressure. Expectations ran high as Mubarak delivered yet another address to the nation. This time he announced the transfer of some of his powers to Vice President Suleiman, but still he refused to step down or accept the need for a transition in which he relinquished power. The crowds in Tahrir Square were infuriated.”

“The next day, February 11, Mubarak finally accepted defeat. Vice President Suleiman, looking worn and drawn, appeared on television and announced that the President had stepped down and ceded all his powers to the military leadership. An Army spokesman read a statement pledging to “conduct free and fair presidential elections” and answer “the legitimate demands of the people.” Mubarak himself did not speak, instead quietly departing Cairo for his residence on the Red Sea. Unlike Ben Ali in Tunisia, he did not flee the country, staying true to his defiant promise, “I will die in Egypt.” That last act of stubbornness left him exposed to prosecution and retribution, and he has spent the following years under house arrest, in court, or in the hospital as his health reportedly declined.”

“About a month later I visited Cairo and walked through Tahrir Square myself. My security team was nervous about what we were heading into; it was a complete unknown. But as Egyptians thronged around me, the overwhelming message was one of warmth and hospitality. “Thank you for coming,” several people said. “Welcome to the new Egypt!” others shouted. They were proud of the revolution they had won.
Then I met with a number of the students and activists who had played leading roles in the demonstrations. I was curious to”

“hear about their plans to move from protests to politics and how they planned to influence the writing of a new Constitution and contest the upcoming elections. I found a disorganized group not prepared to contest or influence anything. They had no experience in politics, no understanding about how to organize parties, run candidates, or conduct campaigns. They didn’t have platforms and showed little interest in forming them. Instead they argued among themselves, blamed the United States for a variety of sins, and were largely dismissive of electoral politics. “Have you considered forming a political coalition and joining together on behalf of candidates and programs?” I asked. They just looked at me blankly. I came away worried that they would end up handing the country to the Muslim Brotherhood or the military by default, which in the end is exactly what happened.”

“The acting head of state was Mubarak’s Defense Minister, Field Marshall Mohamed Tantawi, who had promised to preside over a smooth transition to a democratically elected civilian government. When I met him in Cairo, he was so tired he could barely hold his head up. The shadows under his eyes reached practically down to his mouth. He was a professional soldier through and through, whose bearing and appearance reminded me of General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in Pakistan. Both men were committed nationalists, devoted to the military cultures that produced them, and uneasy with both their dependence on aid from the United States and the political and economic threats they perceived to their respective militaries’ enormous powers.”

“As Tantawi and I talked about his plans for the transition, I could see him choosing his words carefully. He was in a difficult position, trying to save his beloved Army from the wreckage of the Mubarak regime, protect the people, as the Army had promised to do, and do right by the former leader who had nurtured his career. In the end Tantawi followed through on his promise to hold elections. And when his preferred candidate,”

“former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, narrowly lost to Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, he allowed the result to stand.”

“Throughout the delicate transition process, the United States tried to walk a tightrope, promoting our democratic values and strategic interests without taking sides or backing particular candidates or factions. Yet despite our efforts to play a neutral and constructive role, many Egyptians viewed America with distrust. Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood accused us of having propped up the Mubarak regime and suspected that we would collude with the military to keep them from power. Their opponents feared the prospect of Islamist rule and alleged that the United States had conspired with the Brotherhood to force out Mubarak. I wasn’t sure how we could be accused of both aiding and foiling the Muslim Brotherhood, but logic never gets in the way of a good conspiracy theory.”

“When I returned to Egypt in July 2012, I found the streets of Cairo once again seething with protests. But this time they weren’t directed at the government—they were directed at me. Crowds gathered outside my hotel, and as we drove into its parking garage through the side entrance, people banged on our vehicles. Egyptian police did nothing to stop them, and my Diplomatic Security agents were forced to push the crowd back themselves, something they ordinarily wouldn’t do. Once inside my room more than a dozen stories up, I could hear the din of angry anti-American chants. My security and staff spent an anxious night prepared to evacuate the hotel if required. Despite warnings of more protests in Alexandria, I insisted we stick to the plan and fly there the next day to officially open a renovated American Consulate. After the event, as we left to get into our”

“cars, we were forced to walk near the angry crowd. Toria Nuland, my intrepid spokeswoman, was hit in the head by a tomato (she took the blow gracefully), and a man pounded his shoe against my car’s window as we pulled out heading to the airport.
In Cairo, along with separate meetings with Morsi and the generals, I sat down with a group of concerned Coptic Christians at the U.S. Embassy. They were deeply anxious about what the future held for them and their country. It was a very emotional, personal conversation.”

“One of the most moving scenes from the revolution in Tahrir Square was when Christian protesters formed a protective circle around their Muslim comrades during the call to prayer. The reverse happened when the Christians celebrated a Mass. Sadly, that spirit of unity had not lasted. Just a month after the fall of Mubarak, there were reports from the city of Qena that a group of Salafists had cut off the ear of a Coptic Christian schoolteacher and burned his house and car. Other attacks followed. Morsi’s election only heightened fears in the Christian community.”

“In our meeting, one of the more agitated participants brought up an especially outrageous canard. He accused my trusted aide Huma Abedin, who is Muslim, of being a secret agent of the Muslim Brotherhood. This claim had been circulated by some unusually irresponsible and demagogic right-wing political and media personalities in the United States, including members of Congress, and now it had turned up in Cairo. I wasn’t going to let that stand and told him in no uncertain terms how wrong he was. After a few minutes of conversation the embarrassed accuser apologized and asked why a member of the U.S. Congress would make such an assertion if it wasn’t true. I laughed and said that unfortunately plenty of falsehoods are circulated in Congress. After the meeting Huma went right up to the man, politely introduced herself, and offered to answer any questions he had. It was a characteristically gracious move on her part.”

“Privately I was furious at the attacks on Huma by several ignorant House members. So I was grateful to Senator John McCain, who had gotten to know her over the years, when he went to the floor of the Senate and made his own disdain clear: “When anyone, not least a member of Congress, launches vicious and degrading attacks against fellow Americans on the basis of nothing more than fear of who they are, in ignorance of what they stand for, it defames the spirit of our nation, and we all grow poor because of it. Our reputations, our character, are the only things we leave behind when we depart this earth. And unjust acts that malign the good name of a decent and honorable person, is not only wrong, it is contrary to everything we hold dear.”

“Several weeks later, with Huma sitting at his side at the White House’s annual Iftar dinner to break the Ramadan fast, President Obama also defended her, saying, “The American people owe her a debt of gratitude—because Huma is an American patriot, and an example of what we need in this country—more public servants with her sense of decency, her grace and her generosity of spirit. So, on behalf of all Americans, we thank you so much.” The President of the United States and one of our nation’s most renowned war heroes make quite a one-two punch. It was a real testament to Huma’s character.”

“In our meeting I told the Coptic leaders that the United States would stand firmly on the side of religious freedom. All citizens should have the right to live, work, and worship as they choose, whether they be Muslim or Christian or from any other background. No group or faction should impose its authority, ideology, or religion on anyone else. America was prepared to work with the leaders that the Egyptian people chose. But our engagement with those leaders would be based on their commitment to universal human rights and democratic principles.
Unfortunately the months and years that followed proved that my early concerns about the difficulties of democratic transi”

“tions were well-founded. The Muslim Brotherhood consolidated its power but failed to govern in a transparent or inclusive fashion. President Morsi clashed frequently with the judiciary, sought to marginalize his political opponents rather than build a broad national consensus, did little to improve the economy, and allowed the persecution of minorities, including the Coptic Christians, to continue. But he did surprise some skeptics by upholding the peace treaty with Israel and by helping me negotiate a cease-fire in Gaza in November 2012. Once again the United States faced our classic dilemma: Should we do business with a leader with whom we disagreed on so many things in the name of advancing core security interests? We were back on the high wire, performing the balancing act without easy answers or good options.”

“In July 2013, with millions of Egyptians again protesting in the streets, this time against the overreaches of the Morsi government, the military under Tantawi’s successor, General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, stepped in a second time. They removed Morsi and began an aggressive new crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.”

“As of 2014, the prospects for Egyptian democracy do not look bright. Sisi is running for President with only token opposition, and he appears to be following in the classic mold of Middle Eastern strongmen. Many Egyptians seem tired of the chaos and ready for a return to stability. But, there is little reason to believe that restored military rule will be any more sustainable than it was under Mubarak. To do so it will have to be more inclusive, more responsible for the needs of the people, and eventually, more democratic. In the end, the test for Egypt and other countries across the Middle East will be whether they can build credible democratic institutions that uphold the rights of every citizen while providing security and stability in the face of old enmities across faith, ethnic, economic, and geographic divides. That will”

“not be easy, as recent history has shown, but the alternative is to watch the region keep sinking into the sand.”

Excerpt From: Hillary Rodham Clinton. “Hard Choices.” Simon & Schuster. iBooks. 
This material may be protected by copyright.

Check out this book on the iBooks Store: https://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewBook?id=631857836



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Saturday, April 26, 2014

Fwd: ' فهمي يستقبل رئيس إتحاد المصريين في أوروبا



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From: essam samad <essamsamad121@hotmail.com>
Date: 26 April 2014 14:12:20 BST
Subject: ' فهمي يستقبل رئيس إتحاد المصريين في أوروبا


 





http://www.el-balad.com/914340
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Fwd: , المصريين بأوروبا" يرفض تدخل أمريكا فى الشئون الداخلية وأحكام القضاء



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Date: 26 April 2014 14:14:07 BST
Subject: , المصريين بأوروبا" يرفض تدخل أمريكا فى الشئون الداخلية وأحكام القضاء


 



 
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تقارير مصرية

 

 

"المصريين بأوروبا" يرفض تدخل أمريكا فى الشئون الداخلية وأحكام القضاء

السبت، 12 أبريل 2014 - 06:09

رسالة - جمال جرجس المزاحم

أعلن اتحاد المصريين فى أوروبا، رفضه لما صدر عن بعض مسئولى الحكومة الأمريكية، من تعليقات بشأن الأحكام التى صدرت بحق ثلاثة نشطاء، ما اعتبره الاتحاد تدخلا فى الشأن المصرى.

وبعث الدكتور عصام عبد الصمد، رئيس الاتحـــاد، صباح اليوم برسالة شديدة اللهجة إلى السيد ماثيو بارزون، سفير الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية فى بريطانيا، مطالبا بعدم تدخل أوباما وأمريكا فى شئون مصر.

وأكد "عبدالصمد"، أن الخطاب يتضمن التأكيد على أن ما جاء على لسان الحكومة الأمريكية يعتبر تدخلا غير مقبول فى شئون مصر، وإخلالاً بعلاقاتنا الخارجية الوطيدة مع الولايات المتحدة، كما يمثل تجاهلا تاما للخطى السليمة التى يخطوها المجتمع المصرى فى طريقه نحو الديمقراطية المنشودة، مع التشديد على ضروروة أن يظل الاحترام هو الشعور المتبادل بين الشعبين المصرى والأمريكى.

 



Fwd: , اتحاد المصريين في أوروبا يطلق مبادرة لدعم السفر على شركة مصر للطيران



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From: essam samad <essamsamad121@hotmail.com>
Date: 26 April 2014 14:13:19 BST
Subject: , اتحاد المصريين في أوروبا يطلق مبادرة لدعم السفر على شركة مصر للطيران


 



 



 



 



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Sunday, April 13, 2014

Friday, March 28, 2014

ندء للاعلام

نداء الى كل وسائل الاعلام

يوجد مبدء قانونى يقول ما بنى على باطل فهو باطل

لذا فقد اسقطنا فى ٣٠ يونيو ٢٠١٣ من كان مرشح الاخوان ، عندما ادركنا ان هناك تزويرا لارادتنا كشعب .

اظن انه من الواجب تعديل لغة الوصف له او اتباعه، لان جريمته لم تكن فى الخفاء، انما حدثت امام ٩٠ مليون و ادركوها فيما بعد ، فلا يجب ان يوصف بالمخلوع ، وانما بالمزور ، او اتباع المزور.

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

Keith Townsend: The value of a college degree in technology



Keith Townsend: The value of a college degree in technology
HIGHER EDUCATION | MOST RECENT | MON, MAR 24
http://pulse.me/s/Vp9r2


I had an interesting conversation with a colleague about the value of a college degree in the IT workforce. He has achieved an impressive level of his... Read more

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Thursday, March 20, 2014

Egypt's Invisible Insurgency


Egypt's Invisible Insurgency

After Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi's ouster last summer, analysts warned that a disempowered Muslim Brotherhood might embrace jihad. Toppling an elected Islamist government, some argued, would lead the Brotherhood to abandon the democratic procedures that it accepted only belatedly, and advance its theocratic vision through al-Qaeda-like terrorism instead. Nearly eight months later, however, these expectations haven't materialized. While Sinai-based militants have killed over 300 military and police officers since July, there is little evidence that many, if any, Muslim Brothers have joined the jihadis' ranks.

Yet amidst a crackdown that has killed over 1,000 Morsi supporters, Muslim Brothers aren't turning the other cheek. Armed with improvised weapons such as flaming aerosol cans and Molotov cocktails, they are directing a campaign of lower-profile violence against various governmental and civilian targets, aiming to stir chaos and thereby weaken the post-Morsi regime. Ironically, they are embracing the same tactics that anti-Brotherhood activists used to undermine Morsi's authority after his November 2012 power grab. 

To promote these violent efforts, Muslim Brothers appeal to their supporters through social media, establishing violent Facebook groups that have attracted thousands of "likes." For example, the "Execution Movement" Facebook page, which was founded in early September to call for the deaths of Egypt's top security officials, urges its roughly 3,000 followers to burn police cars. "There are 34,750 police officers in Egypt...80% of them have cars," reads a January 26 post that spread across pro-Brotherhood Facebook pages. "If we exploit the current situation of chaos and, during the night…burned 1000 [police] vehicles...Either the government will compensate [the officers] with new cars, which will cause imbalance in the budget and popular anger...or leave them without cars like the rest of the population, and this of course will have a big impact on their morale and their performance." Indeed, police vehicles appear to be these groups' most frequent targets.

One of the most prominent violent pro-Brotherhood Facebook groups is the "Molotov Movement," which emerged in late 2013. Beyond posting photos of attacks, it provides instructions for mixing Molotov cocktails, constructing Molotov cocktail launchers, and using fire extinguishers as weapons. Its popularity exploded in late January, when it took credit for a series of arson incidents, and it reportedly had over 70,000 followers by the time Facebook shut it down for promoting "vandalism" in mid-February. The "Molotov Movement" quickly resurrected itself, however, creating numerous regionally-oriented Facebook pages that claimed responsibility for burning a checkpoint in October 6 City on February 18, an Alexandria police station on February 19, and three vehicles belonging to a Giza police major on February 21, among other incidents. 

Despite their best efforts, Facebook and the Egyptian government struggle to contain these violent groups, because Muslim Brothers can always establish new Facebook pages and publicize them through other pro-Brotherhood pages. This is precisely what happened after the February 24 arrest of eight alleged "Molotov Movement" activists: As the group's activity slowed considerably, violent Brotherhood content simply migrated to other pro-Brotherhood pages, such as "Islamic Egypt" (554,000 "likes") and "Movement 18" (58,000 "likes"), which touted attacks on police cars, television station vehicles, roads, and even the engagement party of a military general's son. These pages also encourage their members to continue fighting the current regime, and often inspire Muslim Brothers with quotes from Sayyid Qutb and images of Hamas fighters.

Technically speaking, the young Muslim Brothers' targets are physical assets, not human lives. It's a rather false distinction, of course, since people can get killed whenever Molotov cocktails go flying, but this is how Muslim Brothers often rationalize their behavior to themselves and others. As young Muslim Brothers who set a police officer's home on fire told McClatchy reporter Nancy Youssef, "We tried not to kill...It's a punch to scare them." Yet in some cases, Brotherhood-affiliated Facebook groups have called for targeting individuals directly, including for assassination.

The Batman-themed "Bat Movement," which has nearly 1,900 "likes," stands out in this regard. It called on its followers to beat a television cameraman who, it alleges, is a spy for the domestic intelligence services; provided the home address and phone number of a State Security officer whom it's accused of killing protesters; and published a list of security officers in Asyut whom, it said, were wanted "dead or alive."

The "Martyr Brigades" is an even more worrying group. In its first statement, published by the "Molotov Movement" on February 10, the "Martyr Brigades" warned that it would go after "all who were involved in killing martyrs from the beginning of the coup until this day," claiming that it had the addresses of those it intended to target. Six days later, it announced that it had killed an alleged "thug" in Mansoura, and it established its own Facebook page on March 1, promising "retribution" in its first post.

This low-profile violence is likely to continue indefinitely and worsen, because young Muslim Brothers are unlikely to find other, more formal, avenues for advancing their ideology anytime soon. Egypt's military-backed government fears that permitting the Brotherhood to participate politically will enable it to return to power and seek vengeance, and by the same token Muslim Brothers are unwilling to participate in the current transition and thereby accept Morsi's ouster. The most likely outcome, at least in the short-run, is thus a desperately unpleasant stalemate: The Brotherhood cannot beat the post-Morsi regime through its current strategy, nor can the regime achieve anything approximating stability.

Eric Trager is the Wagner Fellow at The Washington Institute.


Original Page: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-invisible-insurgency

The 24 Absolute Worst People To Sit Next To On Public Transportation

Monday, March 17, 2014

الفوضى تطرق أبواب العرب – المقال الأسبوعي


الفوضى تطرق أبواب العرب – المقال الأسبوعي

صحيفة الشرق القطريه الثلاثاء  17 جمادى الأول  1435 –  18 مارس 2014
الفوضى تطرق أبواب العرب – فهمي هويدي – المقال الأسبوعي

إذا لاحظت أن الدولة التي ناصبت الربيع العربي العداء منذ لحظاته الأولى هي ذاتها التي تقود تحولات المنطقة في الوقت الراهن، فإن ذلك يُعد مؤشرا يمهد للإجابة عن السؤال:
إلى أين نحن ذاهبون؟

(1)

المنطوق أعلاه ختمت به مقالة الثلاثاء الماضي (11/3/2014) التي كان عنوانها "نحن نزرع وإسرائيل تحصد
وأوردت فيها عديدا من الشهادات التي عبرت عن حفاوة الإسرائيليين الشديدة بالتحولات التي شهدتها مصر،
وآخرها حظر أنشطة حركة حماس باعتبارها منظمة "إرهابية"
كما أوردت شهادات أخرى عبرت عن المدى الذي بلغه الاسترخاء الإستراتيجي الإسرائيلي في ظل تلك التحولات.
واطمئنان قادة الدولة العبرية إلى جسور التفاهم الممتدة مع بعض الأنظمة الخليجية انطلاقا من التقاء المصالح بين الطرفين في مواجهة "الخطر الإيراني".

ولئن توقع البعض مني أن أفي بما وعدت حين طرحت السؤال:
 إلى أين نحن ذاهبون؟

فإنني أرجو ألا يحسنوا الظن بي إلى الحد الذي يصور لهم أني على علم بالمآلات التي تنتظر العالم العربي في نهاية المطاف، وهو ما لا أستطيع أن أدعيه،
لكني فقط أستطيع أن أشير إلى بعض علامات الطريق الذي نمضي عليه، متصورا أن ذلك يساعدنا على تصور المآلات في الأجل المنظور على الأقل.

وقبل أن أعرض ما عندي من تلك العلامات فإنني أضيف إلى ملف الشهادات الكاشفة واحدة مهمة نشرتها جريدة "الشروق" في 7/3 الحالي، لمراسلها في واشنطن الأستاذ محمد المنشاوي، الذي هو في الوقت ذاته خبير بمعهد الشرق الأوسط في واشنطن ومتخصص في السياسة الخارجية الأميركية تجاه الشرق الأوسط.

في شهادته، ذكر الأستاذ المنشاوي ما نصه:
 لم يتخيل أكثر العرب تشاؤما أن يأتي اليوم الذي يذكر فيه مسؤول أميركي أنه "لو غطى وجوه من قابلهم من كبار المسؤولين خلال زياراته الأخيرة للرياض وأبو ظبي وتل أبيب واستمع إلى تصوراتهم بخصوص قضايا ومستقبل الشرق الأوسط، فلن يستطيع التمييز بين السعودي أو الإماراتي أو الإسرائيلي، حيث إن آراءهم متطابقة حيال تلك القضايا".

وهى شهادة أكتفى بها دون تعليق، وأزعم أنها تشكل إحدى علامات الطريق الذي نحن ماضون عليه.

(2)

ما عاد خافيا على أحد أن الدولتين المذكورتين تبنتا موقفا مقاطعا ورافضا للربيع العربي منذ لاحت بوادره عام 2011،
وكانتا من أشد أنصار الرئيس الأسبق حسني مبارك ونظامه، حتى كان عدم مساندة واشنطن لمبارك إحدى نقاط الخلاف بينهما وبين الإدارة الأميركية،
ولم تكتف الدولتان بمقاطعة الربيع العربي ولكنهما لم تتوقفا عن محاصرته ومحاولة إجهاضه في جميع الدول التي بلغتها أصداؤه، في مشرق العالم العربي ومغربه.

والقرائن الدالة على ذلك كثيرة بعضها خفي تكفلت به الأجهزة الأمنية،
وأظهرها مورس من خلال الدعم المالي الذي بدا باذخا في محاولة صد رياح الربيع ودعوات التغيير التي استصحبته، في حين ظل ممسكا وممتنعا عن الدول التي بلغتها أصداء التغيير.

وقد بدا ذلك موقفا مفهوما اقتضاه الحرص على الدفاع عن النفس وتأمين الداخل من عواقب التفاعل مع أصداء الربيع التي انعشت الآمال في مختلف أرجاء العالم العربي.

غير أن قوة تلك الأصداء بدت مقلقة بحيث دفعت الدولتين إلى محاولة وقف ذلك المد خارج حدودها بمختلف السبل،
 الأمر الذي يسوغ لنا أن نقول إنهما احتلتا مقعد قيادة الثورة المضادة، وكان تحركهما مشهودا في ذلك الاتجاه على مختلف المستويات، السياسية والاقتصادية والإعلامية.

ما حدث في مصر كان الإنجاز الأكبر الذي تحقق في ذلك المسعى.
ورغم أن خلفيات التغيير لم تتكشف وقائعها بعد، إلا أن اندفاع البلدين في الحفاوة به ودعمه بعد حدوثه كاف في دلالته.
 إن لم يكن الدافع إلى الإسراع في إثبات الحضور في قلب المشهد المصري مقصورا على محاولة الفوز بالدولة العربية الأكبر، وإنما اعتبر ذلك بابا أوسع لصد رياح الربيع العربي وإضعافه حيثما وجدت.

رسالة البلدين كانت واضحة من البداية دون إعلان، فهما بالأساس ضد ثورة 25 يناير/كانون الثاني ومع التمرد (المحظور فيهما) الذي أفضى إلى انتفاضة 30 يونيو/حزيران 2011 ومهد لنظام الثالث من يوليو/تموز.

ولست أشك في أن الجموع التي خرجت يوم 30 يونيو/حزيران لم تخطر على بالها التداعيات اللاحقة للحدث،
علما بأن خروجها آنذاك كان إعرابا عن السخط على أداء حكم الإخوان والدعوة إلى إجراء انتخابات رئاسية مبكرة،
لكن ما حدث بعد ذلك لم يكن مفاجئا في خبرة الأداء السياسي. أن يمضي الغضب في اتجاه، ثم يقطف ثماره آخرون ويوظفون الغضب باتجاه آخر.

يغرينا المشهد بالمقارنة بما جرى في عصر الرئيس الأسبق أنور السادات الذي انتسب إلى ثورة 23 يوليو/تموز 52 ثم أخرج البلد من مسيرة النضال العربي ومن الصف العربي،
ذلك أن ما حدث في مصر مؤخرا يكاد يكرر تلك التجربة.

فما جرى في الثالث من يوليو/تموز 2013 انتسب بدوره إلى ثورة 25 يناير/كانون الثاني 2011 واعتبر انتفاضة 30 يونيو/حزيران امتدادا لها، ثم أخرج مصر من الربيع العربي.

لقد كانت السعودية أول دولة هنأت القاهرة بالتغير الذي تم ولحقت بها الإمارات، ثم توالت رسائل الحفاوة بالوضع المستجد مع الحط من شأن ثورة 25 يناير/كانون الثاني في إعلام البلدين.،
وبعد ذلك انهالت صور الدعم والمساندة، التي توالت من باب الاقتصاد وهو الوتر الحساس في أزمة الوضع المصري.

وحتى الآن تم ضخ 16 مليار دولار في الخزانة المصرية. وقرأنا عن مليون مسكن جديد ستقوم الإمارات بتمويلها في مصر، وقيل إن هناك مليونا أخرى من مجلس التعاون الخليجي.
كما تحدثت الصحف عن آلاف رؤوس الماشية التي تم الاتفاق عليها لإغراق الأسواق المصرية بها. وما تم في الشق الاقتصادي تكرر في عدة مجالات أخرى، أعلن عن بعضها ولم يعلن عن البعض الآخر.

لست أستبعد أن يكون كل ذلك مسكونا بمشاعر التضامن والمروءة والمقدرة، إلا أنه لم يكن بغير مقابل،
ذلك أن الدول -حتى إذا كانت شقيقة- ليست جمعيات خيرية، ولكن لها حساباتها ومصالحها التي تتوخاها فيما تتبعه من سياسات.

(3)

في الخامس من شهر مارس/آذار الحالي سحبت ثلاث دول خليجية سفراءها من قطر لأول مرة في تاريخ مجلس التعاون الخليجي، والدول الثلاث هي السعودية والإمارات والبحرين.

وبعد ذلك بأيام قليلة جرت مناورات عسكرية مصرية إماراتية في أبو ظبي حملت اسم زايد (1)،
وفى الوقت الذي كانت المناورات جارية فيه زار مسقط الرئيس الإيراني حسن روحاني في مسعى لتوثيق العلاقات وتنسيق التعاون مع سلطنة عمان،
 ما الذي يعنيه ذلك؟

عند القراءة المتأنية ستدرك أن سحب السفراء كان بداية انهيار وتفكيك مجلس التعاون الخليجي الذي تأسس عام 1981.

يعنى أيضا أن الإمارات أرادت أن تستقوي بمصر في مواجهة قطر من خلال المناورات المشتركة، وهو ما عبرت عنه الصحف المصرية التي ذكرت أن المناورات بعثت برسالة إلى قطر وتركيا (البعض أضاف الولايات المتحدة).

يعني ذلك أيضا أن إيران ارتفعت أسهمها أكثر في الخليج، بعد التفاهمات التي حدثت بين واشنطن وطهران بخصوص المشروع النووي الإيراني،
إذ وجدت أن الظرف بات مواتيا لمد مزيد من الجسور مع السلطنة التي شهدت التفاهمات الإيرانية الأميركية
(أعلن يوم الأحد 16/3 أن إيران تعتزم بناء عشر محطات نووية على سواحل الخليج وبحر عُمان).

هل هذا كل شيء؟..
ليس بالضبط، لأنه يعني في الوقت ذاته أن الأوراق بصدد الاختلاط في الخليج،
الأمر الذي يؤدي إلى ظهور خرائط جديدة له تستصحب تحالفات عربية جديدة ستكون مصر طرفا فيها، وستقوم السعودية ومعها الإمارات بدور القيادة لها.

سننحي جانبا مظاهر الفوضى المشرقية التي تلوح في سوريا والعراق وبدرجة أو بأخرى لبنان،
 ولن نتحدث عن أصداء الداخل في السعودية والإمارات حيث مكنتها التوازنات الجديدة من تشديد القبضة الأمنية وإحكام قمع أصوات دعاة الإصلاح الذين أصبحوا يصنفون كإرهابيين، وهو ما لاحظناه من محاكمات النشطاء في البلدين، التي طالت حتى المغردين الذين يسجلون خواطرهم على موقع "تويتر".

لن نخوض أو نفصل في هذا أو ذاك، لكننا سنجد أننا بصدد خرائط جديدة للاستقطاب.
واحدة تضم السعودية والإمارات والبحرين وبدرجة ما الكويت. ومعها مصر والأردن وإسرائيل،
والثانية تضم قطر وتركيا وتونس وبدرجة ما إيران وسلطنة عُمان.
وهناك دائرة الدول التي تقف في "البين بين" مثل المغرب والسودان واليمن وموريتانيا والجزائر. (ليبيا لاتزال تبحث عن موقع).

لسنا نبالغ إذا قلنا إن العالم العربي مقبل على حالة من الفوضى التي تظل الأبواب خلالها مفتوحة أمام مختلف الاحتمالات، سلبية كانت أم ايجابية.

(4)

إذا جاز لي أن أستخلص علامات أخرى من هذه الخلفية فلعلي أوجزها فيما يلي:

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إذا كانت مصر بصدد الخروج من الربيع العربي ولو مؤقتا، فالقدر الثابت أنها خرجت من دائرة التأثير، عربيا وإقليميا وفى أوضاعها الاقتصادية المتردية والسياسة المأزومة فإنها أصبحت مفعولا به وليست فاعلا.

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إن العالم العربي لم يعد بحاجة إلى مؤامرات تحاك ضده في الخارج، لأن صراعات دوله تحقق لأي متآمر عليه مراده دون حاجة لبذل أي جهد من جانبه،
 حتى أزعم بأن الصراع العربي العربي أصبح الشاغل الأساسي "والقضية المركزية" للأنظمة القائمة.

- إن التدهور الحاصل في منطقة الخليج الذي لايزال سياسيا حتى الآن، مرشح لأن يتطور إلى حصار اقتصادي لقطر يضغط عليها بحيث يقطع الطريق البري الذي يوصل إليها من السعودية،

وهناك تسريبات لا أريد أن أصدقها تتحدث عن احتمالات المواجهة العسكرية بين البلدين، خصوصا إذا تحققت الدعوة إلى إقامة اتحاد بين الدول الثلاث السعودية والإمارات والبحرين.

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إن ما حدث يمثل ضربة موجعة للربيع العربي، ليست بالضرورة نهاية له، رغم أن إعلام الثورة المضادة مستمر في تشويهه واعتباره كارثة حلت بالأمة،
لكنني أزعم أننا بصدد حالة من الجزر والتراجع مماثلة لما شهدته ثورات أخرى.

ويظل الباب مفتوحا لتحول ذلك الجزر إلى مد يعيد الأمل والثقة في الربيع.
على الأقل فذلك ما نلاحظه في تحرك شباب الثورة في مصر، الذي يرفض الاستسلام للتراجع ويقاومه بشدة.

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إن قضية فلسطين لم يعد لها ذكر في الخطاب السياسي العربي الراهن.
ولذلك فإنني أعتبر أن إسرائيل هي الفائز الأكبر في التحولات الراهنة حيث لم تعد سياساتها محل اعتراض أو حتى اكتراث من جانب الأنظمة العربية.
ولا نستطيع أيضا أن نتجاهل ارتفاع أسهم إيران وتقوية ساعدها خليجيا ومشرقيا.

لا أعرف إلى أين نحن ذاهبون بعد ذلك.
 لكن الذي أعرفه أننا سائرون على طريق الندامة، وليس السلامة بأي حال.
والله أعلم بعد ذلك بالمآلات.

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Original Page: http://fahmyhoweidy.blogspot.com/2014/03/blog-post_18.html